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or
DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER' - BUT BOLD TS FOR NOW!
by
Baruch Hirson, Julia Wells, and Judie Jancovich.*
The Turbulent Years - 1915-1914
On Saturday, 5 July 1913, the day after the declaration of a
general strike, and a night of riots, British troops confronted
crowds in central Johannesburg.3 They dispersed groups in the
streets, and then forming a square, fired volley after volley into
the gathering crowd. Thereafter they fired at any civilian who came
into view. More than twenty were killed, and several hundred were
injured.
The 4th July had been no less violent. Dragoons and Mounted
police, wielding pickhandles and flat swords, dispersed a meeting
at which a general strike in support of the mine workers was to be
announced. The crowd scattered, and stopped trams and trains
running; burnt down the central railway station, and the Star
newspaper building; looted gunsmiths, and broke down shop fronts.
In neighbouring Benoni, where the strike began, crowds rampaged
through the streets, burning down buildings, and beating up scabs.
In other mining towns there was an uneasy calm. The cycle of
violence only ended when Generals Botha and Smuts <the Prime
Minister and his Minister of Defence) intervened on Saturday
afternoon, and conceded the main demands of the striking miners.
Two weeks later, at a protest meeting in Cape Town, Rev. R.
Balmsworth in a scathing condemnation of the shootings, stated:
If you ask me who were the worst enemies of the town... I
would say, the military, and those upper class hooligans who
directed this cruel work. It is a strange thing to say, but
nobody seemed afraid of the strikers, everybody was afraid of
the soldiers.3
Olive Schreiner, novelist and socialist, believed the massacre
should have served to show the mass of our people in this
country the true conditions under which ite are living. The
death of those innocent persons will not have been in vain, if
we make the light it has shed on our position as citizens of
1
 Julia wells did the research work on the woman's anti-pass
campaign for her PhD; Judie Jancovich sought out the information on
Jagersfontein; and Baruch Hirson found new material on the strikes,
for a biography (together with Bwyn Williams) on D Ivon Jones.
a
 The country's defence force had just been reorganised, and
was not ready for action; therefore British troops were requested
by General Smuts. They were also undoubtedly more 'reliable*.
3
 Reported in Cape Times. 21 July 1913.
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South Africa one which will dominate our future actions,
political and social."
In a letter to Edward Carpenter she wrote:
If they shoot us down in this way the moment WHITE labourers
strike, what will it be whenever the native moves? And they
are bringing in more and more oppressive laws against the
latter. We have just passed a terrible native Land Bill - the
worst bit of work we have done for years."
It was too much to hope that in South Africa, whites would have
learnt 'the true conditions under which [they] were living', but
Olive Schreiner's fears of what would happen when the black workers
moved, was tragically borne out on Friday, 9 January 1914. White
railway men were out, and a general strike imminent, when several
hundred Sotho workers refused to go underground at the diamond mine
in Jagersfontein.A They were confronted, not by troops, but by over
a hundred white workers, armed with shotguns, rifles and revolvers.
Several volleys were fired, killing at least sixteen and wounding
thirty-six (some seriously).7
First reports of this massacre in the press, were buried amidst
news of the railway strike — and what appeared was bizarre, Nine
thousand blacks had risen and stormed into the town, but were
driven back by 500 neighbouring farmers, alongside miners armed by
the diamond company. White women and children reputedly fled to
Fauresmith or nearby hills, or found refuge in the town hall."
Later reports were more detailed, but still alarmist. Following the
death of one of their compatriots, the Sotho in the mine stopped
work and 'were in a most turbulent state'. They had "created much
* Ibid.
° Letter to E. Carpenter, quoted in Labour Leader, 28 August
1913. There is no copy in the Carpenter collection at Sheffield.
* Jagersfontein, in the Orange Free State, was six miles from
Fauresmith. It boasted five hotels, a public library, two banks,
and a town hall. The population, of some 8—9,000 (mostly black
mineworkers) was largely concentrated in the mine, which produced
the best quality diamonds in South Africa, and accounted for 10'/. of
the country's output. They were sold almost exclusively in the USA.
It had an authorised capital of £lm. pounds, half in preference
shares paying cumulative dividends of 257. per annum. All other
profits went to the other shares!
7
 There were garbled accounts in the South African press at
the time, but no reports on the independent inquiry in Basutoland.
R.K. Cope, Comrade Bill; The Life and Times of W.H. Andrews,
Worker's Leader. Stewart Printing, Cape Town, c. 1942, pp. 160—1,
gives a brief account; Terence Ranger consulted the Lesotho
archives for his 'Faction Fighting, Race Consciousness and Worker
Consciousness: A Note on the Jagersfontein Riots of 1914', South
African Labour Bulletin. Vol.4, No.5, September 1978.
" These reports, with few variations, appeared in the local
press, and were repeated in the British press: see e.g. Star. 10
January 1914; Manchester Guardian. 12 January 1914.
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disturbance and smashed a number of houses in the compound',after
moving initially "determinedly towards the town, and it was only a
shower o-f bullets which impeded their mad rush ... "*
Much was ascribed to the example set by white workers, and the
Deputy Inspector of Mines, saying that the Sotho were aware of the
strike on the Rand, concluded that:
They ... understood that the whites were actually fighting —
probably from not being able to distinguish in meaning between
striking and fighting. It is notorious how quickly natives get
into and how easily they become affected by excitement and
unrest. Further comment is unnecessary (sic).1O
He also claimed that the main culprits were several hundred Sotho
workers, transferred from the Premier diamond mines in Pretoria,
after striking seven weeks previously.11 He also 'dismissed without
comment' complaints of 'abuse of natives by miners [which] were of
the most vague and illusive character'. It was 'purely a matter of
rioting and disorder among a proportion of the native employees
having had to be met by armed force'.12
Vet, Daniel Molipha (or Molifa), a Sotho miner, had died as the
result of injuries received underground, and three white miners
were accused of murdering him. One man was charged, but went free
because of 'insufficient evidence' and the Attorney General refused
to prosecute the others. There the matter rested - one further
moment in the history of South Africa's working class that was
buried with its victims, until disinterred many decades later.
In this paper we focus on some of the struggles of the pre-war
years, and explore the factors that led to the radical!sation of
leading members of the all white South African Labour Party (SALP).
What seems to need explanation is not only this change, but given
the extent of the clashes, why so few were affected; and why it was
the strikes of white workers (and the miners in particular), but
not the struggles of other ethnic groups — that pushed them to the
left.
v
 Transvaal Leader, 12 January 1714. Other local and foreign
reports were similar.
1 0
 Deputy Inspector of Mines, Bloemfontein, 24 January 1914,
'Report to the Government Mining Engineer', Colonial Office (CO)
4177545.
1 1
 Police brought in to subdue the workers, had fired into the
crowd and killed three and wounded nineteen.
i a
 Ibid. This strike was reported in the press, and a report
of the inquiry on the "riot' of 23 November 1913 appeared in the
Transvaal Leader. 3 January 1914.
Struggles. Convergent and Diverpent
There was little peace in the Union of South Africa be-fore the
outbreak of the First World War. The institutions of the new state
had to be restructured, or developed, and that included unifying
the railways, drafting a national budget, establishing a new and
unified defence force, The whites split into hostile camps after
1912, and Afrikaner nationalism reemerged under the wing of General
Hertzog's National Party, with a populist rhetoric against British
imperialism and demands for equal language rights. Concurrently,
Gandhi emerged as a leader of the Indian petty bourgeoisie in a
campaign against discriminatory taxes and marriage laws, precipita-
ting a strike of indentured labourers on the sugar fields and the
collieries, The African peoples, smarting at their inferior
position in the new Union constitution,13 were devastated by the
new Land Act, and women in the Free State campaigned against the
passes. And white workers, particularly on the Rand, were engaged
in bitter struggle to improve working conditions, stop redundan-
cies, and secure recognition for their trade unions.
Perhaps the politicians anticipated trouble in 1913. The press
painted a sombre picture, lightened only by stories of society
scandal5. There was talk of the 'black menace' and warnings of a
black revolt; reports on the conflict between Botha and Hertzog;
fears of war in the Balkans; and concern over widespread famine in
the countryside and economic stagnation in the towns. One commen-
tator, referring to mid-1913 said:
Depression reigned in South Africa; the unemployed wailed; the
unemployable agitated; uncertainty stalked everywhere; we were
all carrying on a hand—to—mouth existence.1*
This was the backdrop to demonstrations, passive resistance, and
strikes; imprisonments, massacres, and illegal deportations.
In May that miners at the New Kleinfortein mine came out, and
all eyes turned to the Witwatersrand. Even the Balkan crisis took
second place. In Britain, the Daily Chronicle noting that the Rand
produced VZ7. of the total world gold, predicted 'dire financial
disaster' if its flow were interrupted, with 'grave difficulties on
the Cworld] money markets ... and a crushing blow to the Union of
South Africa whose ... gold Industry is the keystone Cto its
1 3
 Blacks were excluded from parliament, and only a minority
of men in the Cape had the vote.
l
* N. Levi, Jan Smuts; Being a C h c t e r ch o e
Hon. J.C. Smuts. K.U. ru.fl. Minister ot uefence. Union ot South
Africa.Longmans,Green,Bombay,1V17,p^Ol
f inances] '. 1 = The Daily News, -fearing war in Europe urged the Botha
government to stop the strike spreading, least there be a temporary
curtailment o-f the gold supply, le> and the Financial Times spoke of
'•financial crisis' if shipments were suspended for long.1'' Only the
Financier and Bullionist said that "without adequate -financial
preparations being made', the strike could not last, but added in
its next issue, that even i-f settled soon there would still be pol-
itical uncertainty, and a 'somewhat dubious outlook -for money'. 1 B
Strikes on the Rand reverberated through the country, precisely
because o-f the centrality o-f gold in both the local and internatio-
nal economies. No other campaign in 1913—14 a-f-fected the social and
economic -fabric of the country as did a strike in the gold fields,
and no other protest brought so many persons into action. Africans
alone protested over the Land Act, and Africans and Coloureds
condemned the arrest of black women in the OFS; Sotho workers were
shot in Pretoria and Jagersfontein but evoked no protest meeting,
despite condemnation in the Basutoland Council. Only the Indian
campaigns, had the support of a few devoted white intellectuals —
most white workers and 'socialists' being antagonistic.19
The indifference, or open antagonism, to the struggles of other
ethnic groups, underscored intei—community conflicts. The African
Congress rejected a resolution of solidarity with white strikers in
July 1913; Coloured leaders all but ignored the massacre of whites;
and Gandhi said he would not campaign when white workers were on
strike.30 White workers ignored the struggles of other communities,
or turned their guns on them (!). The SALP wanted all Indians
repatriated,31 and supported the Land Act because 'the government
was carrying out one of the planks of the ... Party platform' .:2Z
xa
 Daily Chronicle. 4 July, and 7 July 1913. South African
gold production was t.\5t)m. ex £92m. world wide.
** Daily News and Leader. 3 July 1913.
1 7
 Financial Times. 4 July 1913. On the 7th. the paper spoke
of an 'immense sigh of relief' because the strike was over.
l s
 Financier and Bullionist. 4 July and 5 July 1913.
1-
* The support of 'Tolstoyans' for the Indian campaign was
exceptional, but these were isolated whites, and only later, when
colliery and sugar field workers were on strike, did a few white
trade unionists and socialists offer messages of solidarity.
= o
 Gandhi was reluctant to embarass the government, but see
Transvaal Leader. 10 January 1914, 'Indians want to Help Strikers'
3 1
 F.H.P. Creswell, speaking in the Legislative Assembly,
quoted in Rand Daily Mail. 13 May 1913.
2 =
 W.H. Andrews, speaking in the Legislative Assembly, as
quoted by Rand Daily Mail. 16 May 1913.
These ethnic conflicts permeated the entire society, encompass-
ing white workers and overseers who spurned the labourers; the
'ganger' (or contracting white miner) who was 'baas' to his black
'gang'; and all who employed blacl: servants — whether they were
white, Coloured or Indian. Barriers due to religion, language, and
culture were not impermeable, but were nonetheless there, and
affected members of all ethnic groups. The overbearing attitude of
whites, and particularly of workers, combined the contempt of the
artisan class for the unskilled worker, with that of colonial
overmaster to local 'native'.33
Ultimately, the relationship between man and man, and between
the ethnic groups was influenced by events on the mines, which
dominated the economy. Together with the railways, tramways and
docks, which serviced the mines and were controlled by the state or
local authorities, they employed most of the country's working
class, outside of agriculture and domestic service. Thus, most
labour legislation, reflected the interests of the mines, and this
reinforced the divisions of labour along colour lines in the
country, It also decided the position of black women in society —
but that was largely by exclusion. In the early decades of the
twentieth century, the towns on the Witwatersrand were overwhelm-
ingly male dominated, and this sex imbalance had a profound effect
on family relationships, and a devastating effect on the develop-
ment of the children.2*
There is one further dimension of ethnic division that has not
previously attracted attention — and needs further investigation.
Struggles by different ethnic groups did not reinforce each other,
but set communities even further apart. The whites on strike
demanded that blacks be kept out of some occupations; black women
opposed passes that whites insisted they carry; black miners wanted
bullying overseers removed, and so on. There were also slogans (or
beliefs), and methods of struggle, that set the groups apart.
Satyagraha and courting arrest was not a tactic that many whites
would adopt, and the millinarian beliefs expressed by Indian
labourers during their strike (and particularly their hope that
rajahs would rescue them — or punish them!) could find little
resonance from other communities. .
M
 This included the rights to vote, sit in parliament, man
the bureaucracy, join the armed forces and become officers.
a
* A study of the impact of segregation on black children, s
urgently needed, is outside the scope of this paper.
Black Friday ... And Bloody Saturday*"5
There were 38,500 white workers employed on the Witwatersrand in
1913: some 22,000 on the mines, and 4,500 on the railways, the rest
distributed in the building trade, tramways, print shops, electric
power works, and small workshops.3A The mines employed some 200,000
Africans, mostly as underground labourers; other Africans were
employed in domestic service (or as washermen), or in the many
workshops. All were unskilled, and most were employed for heavy
manual workers, or as carriers and cleaners.
Trade unions consisted of only a tiny minority of the work force
and were almost all craft dominated, restricted to whites, and
concerned with wages and work conditions. If they had any political
aims, it was for the reservation of certain jobs for whites, or
more ominously, that all Africans be removed from the towns. The
Transvaal Miners Association <TMA) argued differently: they wanted
black labourers, but restricted to unskilled jobs, and they opposed
the use of whites as unskilled workers, least they be promoted, and
replace them. Furthermore the TMA's main aim was not higher wages,
but recognition of the union, an eight hour day bank-to—bank — to
shorten the time at the working face, and to combat the dreaded
'white death' (or miners' phthisis).
Phthisis, caused by the inhalation of white rock particles,
produced by drilling and dynamiting, was the greatest killer on the
Rand, accounting for thousands of death every year, cutting down
the average life expectancy to five, or only four, years in many
cases — and even where the miners did not die, "their active work-
ing life ... Cwas3 only four years'.27 Until this was controlled,
the one ameliorating factor would be a shorter working day. Lord
Gladstone, in a dispatch to the Colonial Office, after the 1913
strike said that:
The principle factor [for the unrest] has undoubtedly been the
growing realization ... of the frightful risks from the ravag-
es of miner's phthisis to which their work exposes them...
They gamble .with their lives for high wages, but^there remains
the haunting dread of the future, and to earn £100 a month
(sic) is for them no soporific.
... phthisis has made their life abnormal, and the capital-
ists who are the only visible beneficiaries under the system
a H
 The Evenino Chronicle. July 1913, passim, carried a series
of articles on the July days, using this heading.
="• Gladstone to Colonial Office, 22 January 1914, CO 4990. On
31 January he gave the total number of white workers as 92,000.
3 7
 Evening Chronicle. 5 June 1913.
...have become ... the focus o-f a bitter class hatred on the
part o-f many of the men.2"3
R.L. Outhwaite, the British M.P. who was on the Rand during the
miners strike in 1907, said that the action aimed at "an intolei—
able death—deal ing tyranny' and "endeavourtedl to break ... the
terrible relations' leading to the high mortality in the mines.2*
Revnold *s Newspaper in several articles on the gold mines, which
caused a stir on the Rand, gave statistics of fatalities under the
headline 'City of Dreadful Death',30 and D. Ivon Jones wrote to say
that of the 15 men on the 1907 strike committee, ten had since died
of phthisis, three had the disease but were still alive, and all
but one other were dead, some possibly from the same cause.31 The
issue was summed up by a pro—labour paper that said:
Phthisis must be destroyed or it will destroy the mines, and
with them the Rand. This is where the length of the day comes
into the discussion.32
However, that was not the whole story. There was deep resentment
amongst Labour supporters against the government, the mine magnates
and the press (which was regarded as being in their hands).33 Since
1911 the TMA had fought the Randlords, over the reduction of over—
time pay and retrenchment; victimisation of union officials; and
the refusal of management to recognise the union, or even communi-
cate with union officials on conciliation boards.3* In addition it
="» Gladstone to Colonial Office, 20 July 1913, CO 27645. On 31
January 1914, he said miners earned £20-40 a month, CO 5950.
a
» Outhwaits, in Daily Chronicle. 7 July 1913, quoted the
South African parliament, ana also an authority's claim that 'at
least 150,000, probably 250,000, and possibly 350,000' were killed,
maimed and scrapped in the mines since the end of the CBoer3 war.
3 0
 Revnold's Newspaper. 3 August 1913. The article gave
figures o+ tt+ncan fatalities, and quoted doctor's reports on men
who never reached their kraals, but were found dead on the roads.
3 1
 Revnold's Newspaper. 14 September 1913. Jones' letter was
quoted in an editorial. I he strike of 1907, over the introduction
of more rockdrills per supervisor, was occasioned by the fear of
phthisis.
3:1
 EveniBno Chronicle. 4 June 1913.
3 3
 Manchester Guardian. 9 July 1913. The causes of the strike
as given by Labour leaders to the Daily Chronicle correspondent in
Johannesburg. The principle cause was stated to be the 'terrible
mortality in the mines'.
3
"* Ibid.; Elaine Katz, A Trade Union Aristocracy: A History of
White Workers in the Transvaal and the general Strike of 1*713,
African Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 1976,
pp.326-9; R.K. Cope, Comrade Bill. p.126.
was claimed that there was -fear in some towns least marginal mines
be closed without notice, and the men left without employment.3!s
Yet, in all the conflicts with management, the white workers and
their supporters showed only contempt for the Africans. In what
must stand as the most cynical of the many statements of the time,
that of the Evening Chronicle, sturdy champion of the miners,
surpasses all others. In an editorial column, the paper provided a
rough calculation of the cost to management of shortening the work-
ing day to provide an 8 hour bank—to-bank day. They estimated that
if applied to all workers the annual cost would be £600,000, but if
only white workers were considered, the cost would be £300,000. The
editor concluded:
Our own view is that there is very little objection to such
differential treatment if the true losses can be adjusted.2""
When the clash came, it was at the New Kleinfontein mine in
Benoni - and the issue was union activity:
The management at last arrived at the fact that they were
losing a good deal of profit and appointed a new manager to
"cleanse the stable'."
The new manager, E.H. Buiman, was reputedly a hard task master, and
together with a new underground manager, secured the dismissal or
resignation, of "redundant' miners.3S He also cancelled the Satui—
day half day holiday that mechanics had long enjoyed, and when they
protested, replaced them by non-union labour.
The Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) and TMA demanded that
the Saturday half—day be restored, but management was adamant. The
Transvaal Federation of Trades (the trade union federal body) got a
strike committee elected, and demanded the reinstatement of the
sacked, and recognition of the TMA. By 27 May, engine drivers and
reduction workers were out and the strike was complete. The manage-
ment retreated when told by an inspector of labour that the
dismissals contravened the Industrial Disputes Prevention Act, but
= =
 Evening Chronicle. 1 September 1913. Letter from Buss
Melman, who supported the demands of the 'world working class',
and the SALP, and wanted security of tenure ,,, if South Africa was
to be kept a 'white man's country'.
3<i
 Evening Chronicle. 3 June 1913.
3 7
 Letter from F.D.P. Chaplin, joint general manager of
Consolidated Gold Fields to J.X. Merriman, 15 July 1913, quoted by
Katz, Trade Union Aristocracy, p.382.
=»
H
 Katz, ibid., p. 381.
Mould not ommunicate directly with the union. On 12 June, with the
strike still total, the management brought in scabs.=<*
On 19 June miners at Van Ryn came out in sympathy with New
Klein-fontein. Two days later -five strike leaders were arrested and
infuriated workers all but stormed the Benoni police station.*0
Therea-fter, workers led by pipers in Highlands attire and women
carrying red banners, marched to mines and Victoria Falls and
Transvaal Power Company (VFP) stations (which supplied electricity
to the mines), appealing to the workers to come out,'*1 and were
seldom turned away. By the end of June nine mines were idle —
except -for pumpmen, permitted by the strike committee to stay, to
prevent -flooding.1*2
Scabs were attacked, houses burnt down, and 6.W. Mason, a union
official declared at a meeting that:
No scab had any right to live as long as there was a pool of
water deep enough to drown him in, or a rope long enough to
hang him with."3
The government brought in 540 Royal Scots in a show of force, but
by 2 July the strike had spread to many of the VFP stations. A
broader committee took control and declared a general strike which
was to be announced at the Johannesburg market square on Friday 4
July. The mmeting was banned under the old Transvaal Republic Law 6
of 1894, (forbidding meetings, and allowing troops to disperse more
than six persons on a public square).** But a similar ban had been
defied in Benoni on 29 June, and it was not believed that this
would be any different!
The meeting began, but when the third speaker rose, troops and
mounted police wielding pickhandles, charged and knocked people
down indiscriminantly. When the crowd retaliated with stones and
bottles, swords were drawn, and again and again (using flat blades)
3 9
 This account is compiled from, newspaper accounts; Cope,
Comrade Bill: and Katz, Trade Union Aristocracy. Ch. 9.
*° Rand Daily Mail. 21 June 1913.
** Caoe Times. 2 July 1913, described the procession as the
'Great Red Hrmy'.
*=* Transvaal Leader. 1 July 1913. If the men at the VFP
stations came out,the pumps would be inoperable. By 4 July at
least one station (Rosherville) was out, and workers at Brakpan and
Vereeniging, were considering their position.
*
3
 Transvaal Leader. 1 July 1913, reporting a charge of
incitement to violence against Mason, at the Benoni court.
** Outhwaite, Revnold *s Newspaper. b July 1913. He also wrote
of trade unions b e i n g a matter o+ li+e and death for the workers
if they are to prevent the spread of phthisis'.
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the crowd was driven back, re-formed, and met a new onslaught-*3
People scattered, halted the trains, stopped the trams,"* and set
the centre of Johannesburg ablaze (see above), find there were
running battles between police and those who had seized guns.
On the 5th, the Beneral Strike on the Rand was complete, and in
the early afternoon, as crowds collected near the Rand Club the
Dragoons -formed a square and -fired. Press reports, and Gladstone's
dispatches exonerated the troops, but eye-witnesses told a differ-
ent story. One man at the scene wrote:
Opposite the CRand] Club the cavalry came to the halt and
dismounted^ the crowd flying for safety to the pavements. The
crowd finding the military did not pursue, halted and watched
the scene, and whilst some were thus standing and others
trying to get away, a volley was fired (blank so I am inform-
ed). Seeing that no harm was done the crowd still watched.
Practically without an interval another volley was fired -
ball this time — and they dropped. Altogether eight or nine
volleys were fired and I believe everyone in the vicinity will
agree that there was no appreciable pause between any of the
volleys. It was load and fire. The crowds were runningj and as
they ran the shots were pouring into them. I saw the tiring,
saw the people drop. I was through the war with the first
Cavalry Brigade, but I have never seen such a sight as the
indiscriminate shooting of men, women, and children.*7'
Over 20 lay dead, and over 200 were wounded,*8 Correspondents
likened the events to the Paris Commune,"'* but that was fanciful.
The workers were furious, but did not try to remove the govern-
ment.00 Lumpen elements used the occasion to loot the stores of
Indians in Vrededorp, Fordsburg and Newlands.=1 Even in Benoni, the
imes
rth,to Rev Baimswo  and read out at the protest meeting, (see above).
•"*• Cape Times. 8 July 1913. This report noted the "great part '
played by women who incited the crowd to resist police and troops
on the 4th, led the holding up of the trams, brought the railways
to a standstill, and 'showed the way to ... miners who closed down
the stores in town'.
**• Letter written by 'For Valour', Evening Chronicle. 9 July
1913. Similar letters, written by 'A Scotchman and by tt.S.
Purchase, appeared on 10, 11 July. Extracts of the first letter
were reprinted in Labour Leader. (London), 7 August 1913.
•°
s
 Evening Chronicle. 26 September 1913, reported that the
number of wounded treated at the Johannesburg Hospital for wounds
received on 4 and 5 July was about 170; 89 had been detained for
treatment, 12 had died, and 12 were still in hospital. On 7 July
the paper said that the real total would never be known, as many
sought their own medical attention.
*
v
 Daily Chronicle. 7 July 1913.
= o
 Yet, see Evening Chronicle. 8 July, 1913, for a rumour,
believed by many, that beneral Hertzog was marching on Johannesburg
with 3—25,000 oprecht (upright) burghers to help the strikers.
= 1
 Evening Chronicle. 9 July 1913.
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centre of greatest violence, there was no signs o-f an assault on
the state. The goods station was burnt to the ground, scabs assaul-
ted and some o-f their houses or possessions destroyed, wagons held
up or destroyed, and according to one report: "The Red Flag has
been supreme ... it waves from hundreds of houses and stores. The
police and military have been impotent...'32 The government sum-
monsed 800-1000 cavalrymen to the Rand the following mornings33 and
the red flags disappeared.
On the afternoon of the 5th, Botha and Smuts travelled from
Pretoria and agreed a truce with the Federation; appearing to
supercede, but acting in concert with the mining magnates. The
strike was called off and all disturbances were to end; there was
to be no victimisation, and workers' grievances would be investi-
gated. The government undertook to compensate the scabs,0* but that
was disavowed by the trade unions. Part of the waiting crowd
rejected the truce with cries of, 'What about the shooting?', 'What
about the dead?', and "You've been bought'.03 Others, who accepted
the truce, agreed that it should have been voted on by strikers.3"
Mary Fitzgerald, Dave Kendall, C?] Horak (representing Afrikaner
workers), and others, claimed the settlement offered nothing to the
vast majority who came out, and resolved to continue the strike.37
But there was no organisation or means to continue, and men
returned belatedly to work.
On Sunday the strike committee constituted itself as a Committee
of Public Safety, posting pickets at hotels, bottle stores and
other threatened premises, while police and military guarded public
buildings, banks, and residences of magnates, the Chief of Police,
and Public Prosecutor.3™ Of the 120 persons arrested on Saturday,
25 were charged with looting, the rest with 'public violence'.3"*
Some Africans stopped work in June, at times encouraged by trade
unionists who grasped the need for joint working class action.
3 Z
 Transvaal Leader. 8 July 1913.
3 3
 Daily Chronicle. 4 July 1913.
a
* Transvaal Leader. 8 July 1913. (No papers appeared on
Monday the/th.>
0 3
 Daily Chronicle. 7 July 1913.
3 A
 This was the view of Waterston, a leading member of the
SALP. Transvaal Leader. 8 July 1913.
•"• Ibid.
3 3
 Cape Times. 8 July 1913.
3
* Transvaal Leader• 8 July 1913.
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R.B. Waterston, a strike leaders, called on black workers to:
' Tchella lo Baas wena -funa maninqi mali and picanninv sebenza'
('Tell the bosses you want more money and less w o r k ) , but many
white workers disapproved; and Dan Simons caused a stir in his
address at a Benoni open—air meeting with the words, 'Ladies,
Gentlemen, and Kaffir Brethren'.''0
After the 5th many black workers came out, demanding higher
wages, or wages deducted -for days in which the mine had been idle.
At several mines Africans, wearing red rosettes, refused to go
underground,*-1 and demanded 5s. a day (compared to the existing
wage of 2s). However, most returned to work after a show of force
by troops or mounted police, or threats of instant dismissal. The
'ring leaders' and those who would not resume work, were arrested.
Once again, British troops confronted the workers, with bayonets
drawn, or firing overhead, or "into the ground near their feet', or
charging with iron—shod pickhandles; one eye—witness claiming that
two workers were killed at the Meyer and Char1 ton by men of the
Staffordshire Regiment." Some workers demanded the release of
imprisoned colleagues, or at City and Suburban, shouted "Kill the
Police! ' ,A3S but the strike-was over.
The General Strike of 1914
If the miners struck alone, Johannesburg could still contrive
to get along for a time — probably for longer than the mines
could hold out; if the railwaymen struck too, the case of
Johannesburg was desperate.
Round Table*"*
Throughout July there was talk, first of resuming the strike,
then of a 'suspended strike' (allowing for a walk out at any time),
and finally at the end of the month, the Federation of Trades
decided to abandon the strike and 'rely upon our industrial and
political organisations to remedy our grievances'."15 Through this
period the government was condemned by the Federation and the
Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants (ASRHS), for
*° Report of meeting of 13 June, Cape Times. 9 July 1913.
a x
 The numbers involved are not known. Press reports gave
9,000 in the central mining area nearest Johannesburg, - 5,000 at
Village Main Reef: 1,000 at City and Suburban; 1,000 at Meyer and
Charlton (Daily Chronicle. 9 July); 1,500 in Randfontein
(Manchester Buardian, 7 July); 5O0 at New Modderfontein (Transvaal
Leader. 1O July).
*= Evening Chronicle. 11 July 1913.
•
s>3
 Transvaal Leader. 11 July 1913.
** Round Table. 1914, 'The Soutt' African Strike', pp.231-54.
*
=
 Transvaal Leader• 1 August 1913.
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re-fusing to recognise the railwayman's union, and not investigating
workers' complaints - chief of which were the long hours worked by
train crews, and the pay of unskilled white workers who received
3s.4d, 4s, or at most 5s. per day, when bare subsistence was said
by the union to be Ss. per day.*"5"
General Smuts said that accepting the terms of the strike
leaders on the 5th, was 'one of the hardest things Che had} ever
had to do', and he resolved to be ready next time.'"' Contingency
plans were drafted, requesting that all available imperial troops
be placed at the disposal of the government; advising mayors on
procedures to be followed; and allocating control officers and
headquarters in twelve central areas, in the event of a fresh
strike. Proclamations were drafted, to be signed by the Governor-
General and Smuts when required, specifying measures to suppress
disturbances, and maintain order and public safety.^"s
Reports of dynamite being found on railway platforms, in cul-
verts, and so on, added to the state of uncertainty,*"* In September
1913, when the government was still investigating workers' conditi-
ons, in fulfillment of the July agreement, the Minister for railw-
ays announced that retrenchments would be necessary, and on Christ-
mas eve, the first dismissal notices were handed out, possibly as a
provocation, because the railways were busy, and men were working
overtime. J.H. Poutsma, the union secretary, had threatened to stop
the railways at the first sign of dismissals, and a strike was
called for Friday 8 January.
Meanwhile, on 2 January, white miners in the Natal collieries
came out, demanding 20s. per day, a 57 hour week, and overtime at
one—and-a—half. They also demanded the reinstatement of four men,
laid off because there was a shortage of black labour. Over a
thousand black workers also took action, demanding £5 per month,
but they went back when warned that the strike was illegal. The
"• Evening Chronicle. 21 October 1913, gives details on wage
rates, from the secretary of the Braamfontein branch of the ASRHS.
Union recognition was held up by ASRHS refusal to concede the
administration's right to alter the union's rules 'if deemed
necessary'.
A y
 There were several reports that at one stage J. Bain held a
pistol to Smuts' head, to stop an armed unit storming into the
negotiating room.
*• Gladstone Dispatch enclosing letters from the Prime Minis-
ter's office, dated 25 July 1913, CO 29414. There were also other
drafts on the enrolment of special constables, and so on.
*» See e.g. Rand Daily Mail. 11 July 1913. It seems that this
was largely the work ot provocateurs.
14
whites called for a general strike, and although their executive
demurred, the threat remained.1'0
The railway strike started on the 8th, and most railway workshop
employees came out, as did the train crews in some districts — but
too -few to cause much dislocation.^1 There were doubts about the
role played by Poutsma in what happened: he did not consult the
branches, nor other unions with members on the railways, and there
were -few signs of preparation, locally or nationally. Members of
the Federation advised against the strike, and they were furious
when the strike was announced." However, there were sympathy walk
outs by typographers, building and Municipal workers, and colliery
workers, indicative o-f the depression and discontent of the time. A
week later, just over 9,000 gold miners were out, The Federation
closed ranks and after a ballot, a general strike was called for
the 14th. This was countered by a declaration of Martial Law, and
the total number of workers who responded is unknown, but in the
confusion numbers had little meaning.
Strikers first tried, unsuccessfully, to pull the train crews
out, and then the signalmen, and there was also some attempts at
sabotage. Official sources listed thirty eight instances in which
portions of lines were blown away, explosions occurred on trains,
or on railway property, points were interfered with, and so on. 7 3
But the strike could not have succeeded - and some suspected at the
time 'that the crisis was deliberately sought and prepared for by
the government' to destroy the trade unions and the Labour Party,^^
with Poutsma as the witting or unwitting tool. On the 7th troops
occupied railway stations and workshops in Johannesburg, Germiston
and Pretoria. Poutsma, Justin Nield <his deputy) and Colin Wade of
the SALP were arrested on the 10th, and held incommunicado.~*a Then
came Martial Law on the 13th; the proclamations and special passes
^° Ibid., pp. 150—51; Transvaal Leader. 2 January 1914.
'
rx
 Ann O'Buigley, "The 1914 Strike', The Societies of Southern
Africa in the 19tn and 20th Centuries, Vol.11, Institute o+ Common-
wealth Studies, 1981. '
^
=
 Cope, Comrade Bill, p. 148, says 'he played, a. leading and
exceedingly suspicious role ..." See also pp.150—2 on the position
in the union. ' '---
'*
=I
 A printed list of 'secret outrages committed or attempted',
during the strike of January 1914, CO 7843. See also Manchester
Guardian. 10 January 1914.
•"* Letter sent indirectly to the Colonial Office, of 21
January 1914, signed by leading Labourites. W.H. Andrews MLA
(President of the SALP5, H.W. Sampson MLA, W. Wybergh, S.P.
Bunting, F.A.W. Lucas, and D. Dingwell, CO 5258.
*•= O'Quigley, The 1914 Strike'.
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for movement in proclaimed areas, having been printed in antici-
pation in December.''6
The nature of Smuts' measures were described in the letter of 21
January by SALP leaders (as quoted above):
The situation prevailing here is intolerable, and quite
unprecedented under the British flag and constitution.
The story which has been put about by the South African
press, and no doubt cabled home, of a Syndicalist Revolution,
is entire rubbish, and without the slightest foundation, being
designed partly for British consumption, and partly to enlist
middle class sympathy out here.
.„. It is a deliberate effort to suppress their political
opponents by removing the leaders and terrorising the rank and
file, and at the same time to swamp Hertzogism by exciting
Dutch racialism against the 'common enemy'.
The whole affair has been on our side a peaceful industrial
disputes the Mass Meeting on Sunday, January 11th on Market
Square was not only perfectly orderly, good humoured and self
controlled, but it afforded a dramatic proof that the distur—
bances of the previous July were directly due to the action of
the Police and soldiery in charging the crowd.
On this occasion not a Policeman or soldier was to be seen,
and although the Authorities had suspended the local tram
service, the crowd was greatly larger than the one that had
collected on July 4th.
The authors listed the stringent measures imposed under martial
law. The offices of trade unions and the SALP had been raided, as
had printing shops that produced leaflets for the labour movement —
and their machines destroyed. There were arrests, without legal
help being allowed, of M.Ps (Creswell and T. Boydell); of Provin-
cial and town councillors, and of candidates in forthcoming elec-
tions; and of the entire executives of the ASE and the ASRHS,
although all opposed violence:
The severest sentences are anticipated and the deportation of
the Leaders is believed to be imminent. Railway and mine
workers are being evicted everywhere.
It is an offence ... to advise any person to strike or to
continue to strike or to assist a striker or his family in any
way. The police also looted the Strike Distress Committee's
food supply in Pretoria.
There were bans on wearing SALP colours, on the red flag, or
using the words 'scab' and 'blackleg'. "A man got £2 or fourteen
days for looking 'sneeringly' at a Policeman ...' Permits were
needed to cross magisterial boundaries, or to use wheeled vehicles
(and these were usually refused); meetings of more than six persons
were banned; news censored; and prominent persons restricted to
their houses, or shadowed by police spies:
All centres are swarming with Burghers, who are to be allowed
to retain their arms and accoutrements permanently.
Racialism has been directly revived by the Government
through this means and has received great impetus...
y
* Cope, Comrade Bi1I. p.150. The proclamation terms were
printed in the press, see Iransvaal Leader. 14 January 1914.
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The public is menaced everywhere by Police, Burghers and
Civilian Force with -fixed bayonets, tino-f-fending people walking
the streets are ruthlessly handled, herded into arcades, and
driven like cattle to the Charge Office under Police guard.
Apart from all questions o-f detail, the serious -features are
that, as in the case o-f the Indians, the armed forces o-f the
country are being used, not to suppress violence, but to
terrorise men into working. Secondly. That the public services
of the country, such as post^ telegraph, telephone and the
public press are being controlled under the pretext of Martial
Law not merely so as to prevent incitement to violence but to
prevent any criticism of the Bovernment and to avoid any
information being made public either here or in England which
the Government finds inconvenient. Thirdly. That these things
are being done for Party Political purposes, relating partly
to the domestic issues between Botha and Hertzog, but still
more to the tacit combination of Botha and the capitalists to
stem the rising forces of the Labour Party, in particular of
Botha's public and repeated assertions that "socialism cannot
be allowed in South Africa'.
After commenting on General de la Rey's statement that his men had
responded "to the call of their party, which was represented by the
Government in power', they concluded that the government's actions
would 'undoubtedly be endorsed by the Union Parliament', and they
hoped the Indemnity Bill would be vetoed by the king.
Some 70—100,000 men from the army, defence force, police, and
burgher 'commandos', were called up by the government - including
many who were strikers;77 and special constables were enrolled to
replace police called up for strike duty. All railways, communica-
tion networks, power stations, and mines were placed under guard.70
On 15 January the mass round up of trade unionists began. First the
Pretoria and Johannesburg strike committees, and hundreds of
"strikers' in Benoni. Activists in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban,
Volksrust, Bloemfontein, Cape Town, and so on, were arrested. The
armed forces were instructed to root out the forces of 'anarchy',
and the nadir of this action consisted of investing the Trades Hall
with 4,000 troops, training a field gun on the building, and
demanding the surrender of the incumbents — eleven members of the
Federation executive, and thirty two pickets.7"»
The use of the army was not without its own internal contradic-
tions. There were 30,000 burghers under arms, and there was open
talk of the commanders arresting Botha and Smuts, and proclaiming a
Republic. Denys Reitz, a Botha man, recalled that the troops he led
from Heilbron, in the Free State, had to be harangued for two days
7 7
 Gladstone Dispatch, 22 January, CO 4990, p.16.
7
= O'Quigley, "The 1914 Strike'; Cope, Comrade Bill. pp.154-5,
describes the measures (and the brutalities) at the armed forces.
The Transvaal Leader• 13 January 1914, under the heading "Free
State an Armed Camp', said that streets in Bloemfontein recalled
war days, but that strikers were 'orderly and peaceful'.
7
' Cope, Comrade Bil1. p.153.
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before they would cross into the Transvaal.8O They were also bent
on discrediting the government — thus Beneral Beyers, the newly
appointed Commander—in—Chief, gave orders in Germiston to arrest
'every man i-f he looked like a striker ..." and marching at the
head o-f his troops, deliberately created a great deal of resentment
among orderly citizens.B» Whether other brutalities were similarly
motivated is not recorded. Troops wielded sjamboks and rifle butts
indiscriminately, and men and women were herded into cattle pens,
or marched several miles to gaols, and so on.?2 By way of contrast,
members of Commandos fraternised with strikers in some districts,
after hearing their complaints.
The strike was over by the 21st, and the men went back defeated.
Nearly 700 railwaymen were retrenched, and many had to accept lower
rates of pay.03 The position of the ASRHS was precarious, with the
men "crushed and dispirited', and working under conditions that
left them in despair. They could "not cease work, nor absent them-
selves from duty, nor write to the press, nor in any way communi-
cate their grievances to the public - under the threatened penalty
of six months hard labour, or a fine of £50, or both'."* There was
also widespread victimisation. Hundreds of strikers were black-
listed; former executive members of the ASRHS were dismissed, and
in some regions, membership of the union was proscribed.
The ultimate move by Smuts, was to covertly move nine men on the
night of 27/28 January, from prison in Johannesburg, and place them
on the Umoeni in Durban. Despite attempts by members of the SALP to
have this illegal deportation stopped, the boat could not be
stopped at sea, and the men, not all of them leaders of the strike,
were shipped to Britain.Ba Smuts was indemnified by parliament, but
he had antagonised many people, and this was made obvious by the
election results for the Transvaal Provincial Council elections, in
which the SALP made significant advances, and won 23 seats.
B O
 Denys Reitz, Trekking On. Faber, 1933, pp. 63-5.
D 1
 Ibid.
a
= Cope, Comrade Bi11• p.154.
B 3
 O'Quigley, 'The 1914 Strike*.
°* Letters from J. Nield to his sister, Ada Nield Chew,
reprinted in Labour Leader. 18 June 1914, and in Socialist
(Glasgow), July Itlt.
D H
 The deportation was forecast in the letter to the Colonial
Office of 21 January (above). Cope, Comrade Bill • p.158, cites a
similar prediction in the conservative South AfFica ten days before
the event.
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The Natal Indian Worker's Strike*3"
For ninety years after emancipation, sugar planters and sugar
workers ... worked out the inheritance of slavery... As part
of the world demand for raw materials, the Indians voyaged
across the seas ... to labour upon the plantations ...
Hugh Tinker, ft New System of Slavery07
From 1860—1911 Indian indentured labourers arrived in South
Africa primarily to work on the sugar plantations, and then in the
collieries, the railways and elsewhere.OB In 1903, the Indian
government set a quota after the rejection of its demand that legal
disabilities be mitigated,13** but the system continued until 1911,
when stopped by the Union government. The whites of South Africa
divided on the issue. Employers saw advantages: indentured labour
was not easily organisable, and wages on the plantations were
subminimal.'0 The housing was squalid, the rations poor, and hours
of work during the busy season inhuman."*1 But traders opposed their
Indian counterparts (most of whom arrived to cater for the labour—
ers); and white workers, trade union leaders and members of the
SALP were vehemently anti-Indian and urged repatriation, fearing
that white wages would be undercut.
Men were promised a free return passage after five years inden-
tured, and five years "free' service, or a plot of land. To dis-
courage those who opted to stay, a £3 yearly tax was imposed in
1902 on every non-indentured adult who had arrived after 1895, and
their children (including girls over 12 years, and boys over 16).
There were other discriminatory measures, including the proposed
invalidation of customary marriages (partly to prevent spouses of
e
"" See the pioneer work by Maureen Tayal Swan, 'The 1913 Natal
Indian Strike', Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol.10, No.2,
April 1984.
*" Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery; The Export of Indian
Labour Overseas. 1850-lv^u. UUH, London, 1V/4, p.IV.
BB
 See M. Tayal, 'Natal Indentured Labour in Natal, 1890-
1911', Indian Economic and Social History Review. Vol.14, No.4,
152,184 labourers entered Natal from Madras and Calcutta between
1860-66 and 1874-1911. 26,000 were on plantations in 1908 and
18,000 in 1911.
**•* Tinker, New System of Slavery, pp. 297-8, states that Sir
Alfred Milner's request in 1VO3 for 100,000 men to work on the
railways of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, was blocked for
this reason.
~° Henry S.L. Polak, The Indians of South Africa: Helots in
the Empire and How They are Ireated. Nateson. Madras, 1W/, P. 48.
Men got 10s.xIs.-14s.per month and adult women and youth 5s.x6d.-
7s. for the first five years; and 16-20s. and 8—10s. respectively
for a second term.
•"• Swan, 'The 1913 Natal Indian.Strike', p. 242.
19 .
multiple marriages entering the country), a bar on crossing provin-
cial borders without permits, and a register for Indians in the
Transvaal (to determine the right of residence)."'3
The provincial and national Indian associations petitioned and
agitated against these discriminatory and o-ffensive regulations,
and Gandhi conducted a personal crusade to get them repealed, co-
operating at times with some members of the Indian organisations.
His Satyagraha (akin to "soul-force' and disavowing active retal-
iation against an opponent) had little appeal for the indentured
worker — with whom Gandhi had no empathy, and little if any con-
tact. During 1910-11 Sandhi campaigned against registration in the
Transvaal, but this collapsed when Indians found their trading
licences would be renewed only after registration. Thereafter
Sandhi campaigned for the repeal of the £3 tax, and this evoked a
response from the Indian working class, far beyond expectations.'3
The Indian working class in 1913—14 consisted of some 3,800
colliery worker, 18,000 on sugar plantations, 2,700 on public
bodies (including railway men), and 2,500 in other occupations.v*
The colliery workers were the first to respond to a strike call by
Sandhi and his co-workers, and starting on 14 October some 2,500
had stopped work by the 27th. The sugar workers started coming out
on 5 November, and a general strike called from Monday 10 November,
involved some 17—19,000 men Cand an unstated number of women] for
periods ranging from a few days, to three or four weeks.'" News-
paper reports indicated that all branches of industry in Durban
were effected, and that railway workers, municipal services,
messengers, drivers, cooks, and even house servants across Natal
were out.**
The extent of the strike was indicative of the two factors that
weighed on every worker: the squeeze they felt in a period of
economic depression, and their frustration in trying to escape from
v a
 Indians were forbidden entry into the Orange Free State,
and faced restrictions in the other Provinces.
""
3
 See Swan, "The 1913 Natal Indian Strike', for the factions
inside the petty bourgeoisie, and their attitudes to the workers;
also a review (p. 247) of the Transvaal campaign and its collapse
by 1911. See also M.K. Eandhi, Satvaqraha in South Africa.
Navajivan, Ahmedabad, 1972.
** Report of the Indian Enquiry Commission, Cape Town, US16-
1914. See also Swan, p.249.
*
H
 J.A. Polkinghorne, "Report of Deputy Director of Indian
Immigrants, Natal, for the Year Ending 31st December 1913'. CO
12682.
** Transvaal Leader. 18 November 1913.
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servitude. The £3 tax, which acted as a barrier to their entering
the -free labour market, or even escaping from proletarianization
was the triggering factor in their entering the strike, but their
objectives and hopes ranged -from that o-f the more permanent workers
who hoped to improve their work conditions; to plantation workers,
living under the most degrading conditions, and subjected to super-
vision that was brutal, who believed in the intervention of a
rajah, who (in one version) would rescue them -from their desperate
position.""
On 14 October 78 workers from the Farleigh colliery came out on
strike. When ordered to return to work by the 17th or face prosecu-
tion, they were joined by some 2,000 workers from nine mines. One
week later, 4—5,000 (including railway men) were out in northern
Natal.S>B Initially, the mines kept working, and although no attempt
was made to call the African workers out, the strike effected the
output of coal seriously." On the 29th, the workers were ordered
to return, or have their rations (which many mines still supplied)
withdrawn, lose pay and be in breach of contract.100
fit this juncture the workers joined the satyagrahists in illeg-
ally crossing the Transvaal border. Gandhi hoped that their arrest
would enhance his campaign, and the workers would get food and
shelter in the gaols. From 29-31 October 750 coal miners, some with
families, moved towards the border, and within days, 4,000 were on
the march. The first batch of volunteers were arrested and senten-
ced to return to the mines, which were proclaimed outstations of
the prisons in Newcastle and Dundee, and forced to work under the
staff who were appointed temporary warders.101 However, the govern-
ment was in no hurry to arrest most of the marchers, and the
organisers had to to supply, and pay for, the marcher's food.102
*"• Swan, "The 1913 Natal Indian Strike'. The "rajah" appeared
either as a beneficent saviour, or as a punisher of non—strikers.
There were also claims that Gokhale of the Indian Congress was
coming to abolish the tax, but some said they had come out in
support of Gandhi.
"" Transvaal Leader. 23 October 1913.
•" Gandhi, quoted in Transvaal Leader. 27 October 1913, said
that Africans were not being asked to strike, because there were no
complaints against the employers (sic)•
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 Transvaal Leader. 30 October 1913.
X O 1
 H. Polak, et al, Mahatma Gandhi. Odhams, 1949, pp.86-7. The
trial was reported in Transvaal Leaner. 25 October 191o, The number
sentenced is uncertain^ because of varying reports in different
papers, but was probably less than twenty.
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 The minimum ration per adult, of one and a half loaves of
bread daily, and some sugar, cost thousands of pounds per month.
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The arrest of Gandhi seemed to bring the campaign to an end, and
it might have collapsed, but -for its spread to the plantations. Yet
no one claimed responsibility for calling the plantation workers
out, and Gandhi said that he had told them emphatically not to
strike. Writing to Senator Campbell, he said that after his arrest
it was 'impossible to control the men, and the movement became not
only spontaneous, but is assumed gigantic proportions'.103 Gandhi
explained that he had tried to confine the strike to the collier—
ies, hoping 'that this would achieve the purpose aimed at'. He said
not a word about conditions on the plantations, nor on the shooting
of strikers (see below), and he assured the Senator, that he was so
indebted to him for trying to get the tax repealed, that if he had
called the plantations out, Campbell's men would have been last on
the list.
The strike of field workers and mill operators, was a mix of
peasant revolt and industrial action. Cane fields were burnt104 and
groups of workers patrolled the fields to prevent any work, while
others stayed in their barracks, and refused to venture out. Local
leaders emerged, and were defiant. One group confronted by police
at Lamarcy, near Verulam, said that Gandhi had told them not to
work, and 'The police could shoot if they chose, but they would not
work'.100 There was at least one clash in which there was shooting.
Colin Campbell, son of the Senator, led troopers across the Mount
Edgecombe estate, to persuade workers to go back to the fields, (by
promising to restart rations). xo<i Workers who would not comply came
under gunfire, and at least six were killed and forty wounded.107
The strike bit deep in Natal. Ships ran short of supplies of
bunkering coal, and the mines lost export orders they could not be
sure of executing. Hotels, shops, and railways were short of
labour, and alternative staff had to be trained. But it was Indian
businessmen who suffered most, and many were reported to be doing
1 0 3
 Letter to Senator Marshall Campbell, owner of the Natal
Estates, reprinted in Rand Daily Mail. 5 January 1914.
l o
* Evening Chronicle. 17 November 1913, reported that 150
acres of cane were destroyed, after strips of cane were set alight.
xoa
 Evening Chronicle. 17 November 1913.
1 O
* Press reports, mainly quoting from white sources, altered
in successive accounts, and were radically different from those
told by plantation workers. It is thus not possible to provide a
systematic story covering the events.
xo7
 Gladstone dispatch, 29 November CO 43234, gave four killed
and 24 wounded, and eight whites 'more or less seriously hurt'. The
Transvaal Leader• 28 November, gave 6 Indians killed and forty
wounded (of whom at least two died later): there was no mention of
any white injured.
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scarcely any trade.loe Their support for the campaign, already
strained a-fter disputes with Gandhi, was tempered by the need -for a
return to the status quo, and they tried to cool the situation. On
20 November while rea-f-firming support for passive resistance, they
condemned violence, advised strikers to be patient and give no
trouble to the police; and urged a return to work -for some. Members
of the Natal Indian Association, with police permission, visited
the sugar estates and warned workers against leaving the estates to
which they were attached, or resisting the police. lo<*
No demands on behalf of the workers were ever presented, and no
national leader(s) intervened to state the workers' grievances.
That alone ensured failure. Furthermore, Africans and white women
were being employed in the towns and the railways to replace them,
and there were reports of *Indians rushing to get back their
places'.110 In -fact the Indian workers got little, and many lost
their livelihood or suffered great privations. One estimate placed
their losses in wages and savings as well over £30,000, and many
women were forced to sell their jewellery.111 Living conditions did
not improve, and the workers had little to show for their
militancy, and solidarity with the petty bourgeoisie.
Women in Protest1lz
Our search for the connections between the many strands of
struggle in 1913—14, started in Jagersfontein, where African and
Coloured women (and those of Bloemfontein, and Winburg), refused to
carry passes, or pay fines, and were imprisoned.113 The question
seemed to be whether there were unique conditions in this mining
village, leading to two significant events aver six months, or
whether this was only coincidence.
This required a new look at this province which had some unique
features. Firstly it had only one tiny Reserve, and blacks were
1 O B
 Evening Chronicle. 7 November 1913.
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 Report of Deputy Protector, 31 December.
1 1 3
 Unless otherwise cited, the material for this section is
taken from Julia C. MelIs, 'The History of Black Women's Struggle
against Pass Laws in South Africa, 1900-1960', Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, Columbia University, 1982, Ch.4.
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 Sol. T Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa. Ravan, 1982,
Ch. 7, speaks only of resistance in these three towns. Julia Wells,
reading Free State court and municipal records, also found refer-
ence only to these towns,
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dispersed across the Province, on -farms and in towns. Together with
the arrival of many women from Basutoland, this accounted -for the
almost "normal' sex ratio, in contrast to towns in other Provinces;
and women, Coloured and African, were required to carry passes
under regulations that predated Union.
Political life in the Free State underwent significant changes
in 1913, when its branch of the governing party followed General
Hertzog into opposition in Parliament. The local army commanders
sided with Hertzog, and presumably the police followed suit.11*
Which of these events affected increased police action in May, is
uncertain, but the number of arrests on pass offences increased
considerably, that of women going up four fold in Bloemfontein.
At first the women paid their fines, but from the end of Hay,
through September, women in Bloemfontein, Winburg and Jagersfontein
defied the law, and chose to go to prison. They were led by local
women, many of them active church members, and/or school teachers,
or the wives of ministers, teachers and business men. Half the
women charged were domestic servants, the others claimed to be
housewives.
Although the women won (belated) support from the Natives Con-
gress, and from the African Political Organisation <APO>, they took
the initiative themselves, and faced ridicule from some of their
menfolk. Ultimately they formed their own independent OFS Native
and Coloured Women's Association, led by Catherina Simmons, and
Katie Louw, the president of the Methodist women's prayer group. It
collected funds for the families of women in prison, organised
deputations, and mobilised support.
The first stand against the arrests came at the end of May in
Maaihoek location <Bloemfontein), when a mass meeting of women
resolved not to carry passes if police harassment was not stopped.
A deputation to the mayor was told that he could not change the
laws, and a crowd collected at the police station where some eighty
women tore up their passes — for which they were charged. On Friday
30th, some 600 women marched to the court waving walking sticks,
knobkerries, broom sticks, and Union Jacks. There was a fracas when
the police tried to clear the court, and the women lashed out at
their tormentors. 'We have done with pleading, we now demand', they
were quoted as saying.
" • Control of local police shifted to the South African
Police at the end of April, but we are unable to determine whether
this had any effect on the events that followed.
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The eighty pleaded not guilty, but re-fused to pay -fines, and in
this instance were dismissed by the court. The idea caught on, and
other groups were to emulate them in the coming months, but it was
not always peace-ful. On 16 June, a near riot -followed the arrest of
a woman in the location -for being without a pass. Two of her
friends released her, and when a posse of police arrested all
three, a large crowd collected, and followed them to the police
station. There it is claimed, the police struck a spokeswomen with
a sjambok when she asked what the charges were, and in the fight
that followed the women wielded sjamboks, threw stones, and bit the
police. The next day Bloemfontein experienced its first stay-at-
homes in a long history of such actions. No woman was allowed to go
to work, and "those that tried to escape were beaten'. Furthermore,
said one report, 'The most troublesome were the Cape girls'.110
Thirty four women were arrested as a result of the scuffle with
the police, and found guilty of public violence, but rather than
pay a fine, they went to gaol for two months. This inspired Sol
Plaatje, Secretary of the South African Natives National Congress,
to write in Tsala ea Batho. of 21 June:
Let no woman pay a fine. They should all go and fill the gaol
... Let them build new gaols. It is no disgrace to fill them
for Liberty.11*
The APQ praised the women on 14 June, and advised them not to do
any work while in prison. A fortnight later they criticised men for
not standing up, as had the women:
Our manhood has been almost extinguished. We docilely accept
almost every abject position, and submit to every brutality of
the white man, with little more than a murmur. Not so our
women. They have accepted the white man's challenge, and have
openly defied him to do his worst.
There were arrests in Winburg in May, and on 2 June 600 women of
the location, singing hymns, marched to the Town Hall, and declared
they would no longer carry passes. The Town Council was nonplussed,
and then following the lead from Bloemfontein decided to prosecute.
On 20 June women were given six days within which to carry passes,
and from 1 July the police arrested batches of women, six at a time
— the maximum number the local gaol could take! The penalty was
four days in prison, although this stiffened over time, and by
October was one month or a £2 fine.
The problem of young women over 16, who were at school or
unmarried and not employed by a white person was highlighted on IS
1 1 H
 Evening Chronicle. 20 June 1913.
XIA yet it was Plaatje who urged Congress two weeks la
to pass a vote of solidarity with the striking white miners
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August, with the arrest o-f Ruth Pululu, an assistant school mis-
tress. Ineligible -for a residential pass on all counts, she was
required to take employment in domestic service or go to gaol.
Either course meant that the school would have to close down.1'"
Pass -fees Mere also meant to provide part o-f the revenue with
which to finance location amenities, and when Winburg's white rate-
payers, meeting on 25 September, were told that there was a deficit
of £700 in location accounts, they demanded the immediate arrest o-f
the guilty women, and that additional gaol space be made available.
Resisters were compared by whites (in all centres of opposition)
with British suffragettes, and their sporting of blue rosettes was
taken to be a mark of opposition to carrying the pass, although it
is not clear whether the issue of the vote was raised. One white
woman seemed impressed. Writing anonymously to the Friend of 11
October, she commended the protesters courage, and called for a
demonstration of support by whites. Plaatje, amongst others,
responded enthusiastically, but this proved to be quite misplaced.
The Friend received replies that were largely abusive, and the
demonstration never took place."™
The third centre of active protest was Jagersfontein, and the
situation differed in that there was an active local branch of the
APO and active women in Congress. From May arrests commenced, and
older women responded by refusing to buy their monthly pass.
Negotiations with the town council elicited no response, and at the
end of September 60 women were arrested and charged for not having
passes. Aploon Vorster, described as a Mozambiquan Lady, was their
spokeswoman, and was sentenced to 30 days: the others got seven
days. Thereafter, said the Friend, of 29 September:
... a large number of native girls paraded the streets ...
singing, shouting and flaunting the blue ribbon — the sign of
their suffragettism. They made a rush to the spot where the
fifty (sic) convicted women were under police guard waiting to
transport them to Fauresmith ...[and] police had to requisi-
tion the fire hose to disperse them. Later on some mounted
constables with sjamboks were required to clear the streets.
After October the arrest of women on pass offences seems to have
abated — although the campaign continued for many months. The issue
raised in the address by Or Abduarahman at the annual APO confer-
ence in October, was widely publicised because of its 'splenetic'
tone and 'rabid fulminations':
1 1 7
 The mayor, told in November that two schoolgirls were in
gaol, reportedly said: 'we are not likely to get servants when
native children go to school'.
" • Letter to Diamond Field Advertiser. 16 October 1913, sub-
headed "Help From an Unexpected Uuarter'.
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... this policy of repression cannot last much longer. If a
handful of Indians, in a matter of conscience, can so firmly
resist what they consider injustice, what could the coloured
races not do if they were to adopt this practice of passive
resistance? We must all admire what these British Indians have
shown in their determination to maintain what they deem to be
their rights. The inhumanity of the Free State has driven our
women to resist the law. Thirty four of them went to gaol
rather than carry passes... I am convinced that if our people,
as a whole were prepared to suffer likewise, we would gain
redress of our most serious grievances while General Botha is
still alive. Are we to be driven to that course?11"'
Abdurahman then said: if 200,000 mine workers downed tools, and
farm labourers refused at harvest time to work for ls.6d. per day,
the economic foundations of South Africa would suddenly shake
and tremble with such violence that the beautiful white South
African superstructure which had been built on it would come
down with a crash entailing financial ruin such as the world
had never seen before.13°
But the President could not sustain the mood. He stopped threat-
ening, and pleaded with the whites to prevent such a calamity by
encouraging the coloured peoples to "improve their position and
become more useful citizens'. He prescribed the upliftment of the
"lower classes of coloureds', calling for sobriety and prohibition.
He wanted an insurance society for Coloureds; and called on all
coloured people, not subject to the Native Lands Act, to aim to buy
land. The "splenetic' speech turned out to be rather a fuzzy speech
- but did indicate that the women's struggle had resonated some-
where in the thinking of the Coloured leadership.
Strikes at the Diamond Mines
There were several strike at the smaller diamond mines in 1913-
14, at Koffiefontein, Klipdam, Randfontein, Kimberley, Premier
Mines, and Jagersfontein, many of which have still to be investi-
gated.121 These events were invariably described as riots, and as
far as can be ascertained from cursory press reports, they all
involved some strike action, leading to confrontations between
section of the black work force, or between them and either police.
" * As reported in Transvaal Leader• 30 September 1913. A copy
was sent by Gladstone to the Uolonial Office (CD..37-199) , but there
are no further details in any of his dispatches. ^ Vs .•
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 See e.g. Transvaal Leader. 7 November 1913, on 600
Africans sentenced to one months hard labour, following 'theft from
the compound' during a 'riot' at Smith Mine at Klipdam.
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or white workers.lz= It was only the shootings at Premier mines and
Jagersfontein that led to significant publicity, but once again
strikes were ascribed to 'tribal' -friction, illegal beer drinking,
and so on, trivialising the event, and exonerating the authorities.
Information on what occurred at the Premier mines comes almost
entirely from evidence at an official inquiry.133 Mine officials
said that on 23 November 1913, a policeman struck a worker during
an attempt to stop gambling and drinking at No.6 compound. There
was looting by the offended workers, and then a lull. At 8.0 p.m.
the worker's kinsmen (Basotho), were said to have attacked kinsmen
of the policeman (a Shangaan), in the compound. White miners
intervened to stop the 'looting and rioting', and the Sotho turned
on them. Fortuitously, the whites were armed, and they fired two
volleys, killing four and wounding twenty four. Twenty two Sotho
were arrested.la*
The account is too glib, and if true, begs too many questions.
What was the cause of this 'tribal' friction? Why did the whites
intervene and why were they present with guns? Who were the 'armed
local whites' who somehow appeared on the scene? Why were 300
'troublemakers' transferred to Jagersfontein? In fact, the transfer
might never have been mentioned, if they had not been such conven-
ient scapegoats for the Deputy Inspector of Mines in the events of
January 1914.1ZB
On Wednesday 7 January, an overseer F.M. de Wet Stokenstroom,
and two white miners assaulted Daniel Molipha variously described
as a'boss—boy', the popular compound barber, and also as a 'petty
chief'. He was kicked and hit while down, and been left, unable to
move. Workers carried him to the compound, bloodied and covered in
1 M
 Wages for blacks in diamond mines <7B-89s. for a 26 day
month) were higher than in gold mines (52s), or coal mines (41-
43s>, but were pitiably low. We know little about conditions in the
compounds in the smaller mines, but working conditions were unplea-
sant. Underground tunnels were 1-1 yds wide, with lighting only
from lamps on helmets. Wagons were hand pushed and ran on rails. It
was hot and sweaty, with mud underfoot. The Transvaal Leader. 26
November 1913, reported a roof-fall and the death of two blacks and
one white at Jagersfontein. Body searches were frequent.
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 The report at the National Archives, Maseru, quoted by
Ranger, "Faction Fighting', is similar to the above, taken from the
Transvaal Leader. 25 November 1913. Ranger has his doubts about the
explanations offered at the Inquiry, and we concur.
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» A letter of the Basuto Council to Gladstone, 16 April 1914
gives these numbers. The press reported three killed, and 22 woun-
ded, eight seriously. See Transvaal Leader. 25 November 1913.
1 M
 The Deputy Inspector claimed that the 300 men from Premier
mines were troublesome from the start, affected the labourers, and
were the 'ringleaders and initiators' in the January event.
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sweat and mud, then transferred to hospital, where ,be died the next
day.1M> On Friday morning, one Lenepo, led a group to ask about
Daniel. They saw Nesbitt, the Compound Manager, who said that the
doctor ascribed the death to a ruptured ulcer, brought on by eating
too much porridge, drinking too much Mahleu (beer) and coffee(i),
smoking dagga (cannabis), and to gonorrhoea (sic) • 13r7P When they
asked to see the General Manager, Nesbitt "kicked them away'.12"
This was too much. The men did not believe a word of what they
were told, and called on everyone to stop work until an enquiry
into Daniel 's death was held. Large numbers re-fused to go undei—
ground, and when they -found men of another ethnic group going to
work they stoned them. They also stoned any whites in the compound,
and drove them out.12"* Attempts were made by officials, and by the
General Manager to get the men back to work, but to no effect.
Police officers, together with armed men (many of them miners),
arrived and blocked the three compound gates, and two volleys were
fired, leaving dead or wounded in the compound. As in most such
cases, it is not possible to say definitively who gave the order to
fire, or in fact, why the order was given. At the very worst, one
or more stones were thrown; but even this was denied. The police
sergeant was accused of having given the order to shoot, and many
of the dead were shot in positions that indicated that they were
far from the gates.130 Most damning of all, Machopane Mahapela a
policemen, who tried to appeal to his fellow Sotho to surrender,
was shot twice by the whites — and lay dead.131
The damage done by the mineworkers, was in fact remarkable
slight. They chased the Compound manager and his staff from the
Compound, smashed windows and furniture, and seem to have taken
some £50 and about £300 worth of clothing — although even these
are not certain.13Z The point blank shooting at unarmed men, and
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 From the deposition of Ben Khotso, 15 January 1914, and
Joe Letsie, 17 January, Basutoland Despatches (BD) No 168, 1914.
»="• Deposition of Sepinare Phahlahla, 15 January 1914, ibid.
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" Ben Khotso's statement.
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 Deposition of Sepinare Phahlahla. Mahlabani stated that he
was struck on the back and the leg by a pickhandle 'because I was
speaking to the others'. BD 168.
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 Deposition by Sepinare Phahlahla, BD 168. Phahlahla also
stated that the men were satisfied with their treatment prior to
this affair. Mahapela was a policemen according to a letter by
Chief Griffiths and others to Gladstone, 16 April, 1914, BD 383,
(dated 9 May 1914). See also Rand Dai 1v Mai 1. 12 January 1914.
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 Report, Deputy Inspector of Mines.
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the casualties inflicted on them by the white vigilantes was out of
all proportion to what the men did. Many men panicked and tried to
escape, but when they clambered across the compound fence were
driven back at gunpoint, ft press correspondent writing from the
mine said that 'those who made for the fence did not desire to
enter the town but wanted to get away from the mine, the shooting,
and the general bloodshed, and to make for Basutoland'.X33
When instructed to return to work, the men declared that they
wanted to go home. They would not give evidence at the official
inquiry into the shooting, having little confidence in speaking to
white officials after the recent, widely publicised case, of P.J.
Pienaar, a farmer in the Ladybrand region. Accused of killing two
blacks (a man and his sister), and selling their cattle to dis-
charge some pressing debts, he was acquitted by a jury, despite the
damaging (but circumstantial) evidence.13* Starting on Saturday,
some 600 were taken under armed guard to the border in batches of
up to 200.»3B
Jagersfontein - Whatever did Happen?
At one level there is a simple answer to the question 'Whatever
did hapened at Jagersfontein'? The women in the location, Coloured
and African, and the men in the compounds responded to regulations
or to acts of brutality, confronted their immediate oppressors, and
took what action they could. Racism in the Free State was harsher,
or at least less easily countered, and flashpoint was soon reached.
It was the one Province in which there was no Indian struggle, but
by default — Indians were prohibited in the 'Free' State.
We can only guess at the contact between the women and the men,
but with the sex—ratio of Jagersfontein at around sixteen to one,
and abnormal fcr a Free State town, intercourse between mine and
town must have been considerable. The men would have known of the
women's campaign, (as indeed the women knew trouble was to be
expected on the mines),134 and that must have had some impact on
their own actions, but this would not account for the large number
involved in the strike, nor the violence. Nor could the contact
with the Free State women account for the strike at Premier mines.
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 Friend. 12 January 1914; see statement by Mohlabani, BD 168.
13
» Evening Chronicle. 13 September 1913.
isB gen xhotso, ibid. There were varying reports about the
number sent home, and no reliable figure is available.
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* Some women informed their employers, on the morning of the
strike, that trouble could be expected, but there is no further
information about their contact.
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It is more -fruitful to look at Basutoland, with which the men
kept close links, and to which the men sought to return a-fter the
shooting in Jagersfontein. Three issues would have affected the
Sotho in 1913: the economic depression (noted above), accompanied
by the drought over.South Africa, which was particularly severe in
Basutoland, and the first request that the British territories be
handed to the Union. The drought was probably the most important
issue — and in its wake migrant workers, already under economic
pressure, would have received urgent pleas to send money home.
In March 1913 Botha sought the transfer of Bechuanaland and
Swaziland to South Africa, as part of a plan to absorb South West
Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Mozambique.13*' The Sotho
had always opposed incorporation in South Africa, and they would
have been alerted to continued South African ambitions. It is in
this light that two official reports can be read:
Recent events would seem to indicate ... that the British
Basuto is ever ready to come into open revolt at the slightest
provocation, whether imaginary or otherwise, and on such occa-
sions all attempts made by the Europeans in authority to
reason with them are met with jeers and insults.13"
and also,
At Kimberley ... the Basuto are always regarded as the most
troublesome element in the Compounds, and ... in Basutoland I
have noticed derisive shouting and gestures from the herdboys
and a disinclination among older folk to discourage ... dogs
from making themselves objectionable to European travellers.
Young men on horseback pass one ... with a sneer or a scowl
instead of the friendly greeting of the Cape Colony, the
salute of Natal or the silent deference of the Transvaal and
the Orange Free State. Mud slinging and stone throwing on the
part of the small boys, and the wilful startling of cart
horses are said not to be uncommon.
These things may be mischief, but mischief of a disrespect-
ful almost aggressive sort, and it is certainly not pleasant
to conjecture up pictures of a conflict precipitated by the
spurious class antagonisms which are being -fostered by the
agitators of labour (sic), when aggravated by deep-rooted
antipathies of race and colour.13*
The solution proposed was that the police force in Fauresmith and
Jagersfontein be increased "to say thirty men'.
*
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 Smuts spoke about Mozambique becoming part of South Africa
at a public meeting in Johannesburg, and had been rebuffed by the
Portuguese consul. He raised this issue, together with that of
Namibia, inside the British war cabinet in 1918.
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 T.E. Liefeldt, Inspector Native Affairs Dept,, Report on
Riot at the Premier Mines, 16 March 1914, CO 417/545, 103706 -BD)
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 A.L. Barrett, Inspector, OFS Labour District, Dept of
Native Affairs, 'Basuto Attitudes - Jagers-fontein', 21 March 1914,
CO 417/545 103706 - BD.
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The period we have discussed was one o-f instability in South
Africa, consequent on economic depression, plus the dislocations
involved in unifying local institutions, and in reconstituting, the
army. The ruling class was split, and the new array command was
close to mutiny. With war in Europe imminent, the government, in
its moment of triumph in January 1*714, was probably at its weakest.
If the armed rebellion had not been suppressed so speedily after
war was declared, the government would only have been saved through
an occupation by Imperial troops. The government was vulnerable,
and this was felt <if not always understood) by sections of the
Labour movement. Despite their belief that the railway strike had
been provoked to destroy the labour movement, and then their anger
at the deportation of the strike leaders, they were unable to make
common cause with the black workers,
During the events of 1913-14, the perpetrators of the worst
outrages were the government, the mine owners, and the British
army, exceeding in intensity any actions of the oppressed classes.
However, over and above the actions of the army and police force,
the white workers, when not involved in struggle with the Randlords
or the government, were themselves agents of repression. They shot
down workers at Premier mines and Jagersfontein; acted as temporary
warders in the Natal collieries; and formed vigilante groups to
confront Indians crossing into the Transvaal.1*0 And thus, in
January 1914, when white miners at Premier mines joined the general
strike, African workers Just carried on working. If some white
trade unionists were!aware of the contradictions in their organisa-
tions, and Labour leaders were beginning to perceive the nature of
the problems they faced, they were still blinkered by the belief
that white labour alone could effect change in the country.
Some white socialists did cross the colour line, but this was
exceptional. Amongst the first public declarations of support, was
that of J.T. Bain, secretary of the Federation of Trades, who
supported the Indian workers, and hoped that,
at a later date the party of which he was secretary would
endorse [his statement] that an injury done to the most humble
of their race was an injury done to humanity. They must fight
for human rights, whether for the coloured or white people.
Race must not tel1.
He characterised 'the indentured system as lonel of slavery glossed
»*° See Transvaal Leader. 1O, 12 November 1913, for the
meeting of the local magistrate, and the Volksrust Vigilance
Committee, on their opposition to the Satyagrahists. Also the copy
of IS January 1914, in which the Minister of Justice, N.J. de Wet,
'acknowledged the valuable support given to the Government ... in
resisting the Indian invasion'.
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over and disguised by law'.1*1 Then came a meeting in Johannesburg
attended by several prominent white trade unionists. T.W. Ward (one
of those arrested in July 1913), speaking on behalf of Bain,
described the movement of the Indians as
an expression of their revolt against oppression. But the real
cause was economic ... He was not going to advise them against
passive resistance, but he warned them to be careful, and to
be ready to be shot down. He was not there to stir up race
prejudice, but came as representing a small minority of white
workers on the Reef, who realised that the Indian's fight was
the white workers' fight ... Your brothers in Natal are
fighting your fight. Their fight today will be your fight
tomorrow. Do not forget there were a few white men willing to
forego all questions of colour to help you.1"2
But Bain was vilified in letters to the Evening. Chronicle, which
had provided the fullest report of what he had said, and the Natal
Federation of Trade and Labour Unions, at a meeting of delegates,
reaffirmed the Labour standpoint and called on the government to
speed repatriation. Herein lay the tragedy: the white workers,
embattled in 1913-14 against mine magnates and government, while
strengthening their unions, and building (white) working class
solidarity,1'"3 never extended a hand to the blacks: that being the
price they paid for acceptance into the settler community — at the
expense of their own unrealised working class interests.
Without wishing to place the position of blacks on a par with
whites (as if the interests of slaves could ever be compared with
that of their enslavers), it must still be noted that the actions
of the petty bourgeois black leadership did little to commend them.
Sol Plaatje, champion of the black women, blocked a Congress move
of solidarity with white strikers;1** Gandhi called off his cam-
paign in 1914, in order not to embarass the authorities; and
Abdurahman despite his gibes against white repression, did this in
order to plead for the economic advancement of Coloured business-
men. This was a mirror image (in a very distorted mirror, to be
true) of the pusillanimous approach of the white working class.
x
*
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 Reported in Evening Chronical. 13 November 1913. Several
other white socialists appeared on platforms to express solidarity,
but they represented only themselves. These were leaders without
any troops.
1
*= Quoted in Transvaal Leader, 1 December 1913. As Ward
predicted, they 'had to De ready to be shot down'.
•*= Gladstone makes this point in his dispatch, ibid.
'** Brian Willan, Sol Plaatie: South African Nationalist 1676-
Heinemann 1984, p^ lt>3 states: Kiaatje 'personally drafted a
resolution "dissociating the Natives from the [white miners']'
strike movement" after the idea had been put forward ..."
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The war was to break out soon, extending from Europe into
Africa, and in the process new issues would arise. The leaders of
Congress, the APO, and the Indian leadership all supported the war
e-f-fort o-f the South African government, and the white working
class, or at least the Engliosh speaking section, trooped to the
colours. The Afrikaner workers were in dissent, but they were tied
too solidly to the Nationalist camp to provide any answers. Only
one tiny group amongst the leadership of the SALP had a programme
of opposition and they broke away to form a War on Mar League. Its
leaders were among those who were radicalised by the events of July
1913 — January 1914, but they had not had enough time to capitalise
on the experiences of the strikes. In any event the "War—on—War—
ites' had themselves to be pushed into opposition to the SALP, and
this needed the jolt provided by war; an issue that was not easy
for Labourites, many of whom retreated from the new radicalism by
the patriotism that swept the country.
The war was to affect the workers in different ways. The white
working class was split by the war issue, and the English speaking
section marched off to war. A short boom in the diamond industry
from 1911—13 ended, and the mines were closed from September 1914
till January 1916 "*H - leading to the repatriation of all migrant
workers. 'Diamonds were forever' (perhaps) but were not wanted now.
By way of contrast, to finance the war, gold production expanded,
and Africans were used as semi-skilled replacements for miners who
had joined the army. And it was during the war that the first
industrial expansion occurred, absorbing new layers of black
workers, and tilting the class forces towards an urban black prole-
tariat. The new radical socialists were to be confronted by new
social forces, and they had much to learn before they grasped the
dimensions of the problems facing them.
Xi
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a
 M.H. de Kock, Selected Subjects in the Economic History of
South Africa. Juta, Cape iown, 1 V^t, p. i2£>l.
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